Research & Analysis: Avilian Research Labs, Applied Research Division
Domain: Sports Governance & Institutional Leadership

A defense of Gianni Infantino, on the actual record

Start with the number nobody disputes, including his critics: since Gianni Infantino became FIFA president in 2016, FIFA's development spending on African football has gone from roughly $60 million a year under his predecessor to over $300 million a year under him — a fivefold increase, on comparable FIFA revenue. By the end of 2026, FIFA will have put $1.28 billion into African football specifically, and over $5 billion globally, an eightfold increase in the Forward programme since its 2016 launch. For the 2027-2030 cycle, that figure is set to reach $2.7 billion globally in a single funding period.

If the case against Infantino is that he's indifferent to African football's underfunding, the number that opens this article is a strange place to start building it.


What he's actually accused of, and what happened when it was tested

This isn't a defense built on ignoring the real controversies. There are several, and they deserve to be named directly rather than waved away.

The Lauber affair. In 2020, Swiss prosecutors opened a criminal investigation into undisclosed meetings between Infantino and then-Attorney General Michael Lauber, who was simultaneously investigating corruption at FIFA. This was a serious allegation — abuse of public office, breach of official secrecy — and it dragged on for three years. In October 2023, it was formally dropped. Prosecutors stated plainly that their investigation had found no evidence Infantino had "instrumentalised" the attorney general's office into "unusual, inexplicable, erroneous or even criminal acts." FIFA's own independent ethics committee had already cleared him in 2020, finding "no aspect of the conduct analysed constitutes a violation." A serious allegation was investigated for three years by an independent justice system with no reason to go easy on him, and it produced no charges. That's not a technicality. That's what exoneration looks like when the process is allowed to finish.

The FIFA Forward Enterprise collapse. This is the live controversy, and the honest version of it is more complicated than "Infantino overreached." His own secretary general said staff had been "deceived" about how the process was run — that's a real institutional failure, and Infantino bears responsibility for it as the person running the institution. But look at what he was actually trying to do: raise up to $20 billion to send $20-40 million to every one of FIFA's 211 federations, doubling or tripling money that already goes disproportionately to football's poorest associations. The plan failed on process grounds — insufficient consultation, a compressed deadline — not because the confederations that killed it, UEFA foremost among them, disputed that the money should reach under-resourced federations. If the goal was actually getting money to African, Asian, and Caribbean football, the man who proposed doing exactly that at unprecedented scale is an odd person to cast as the villain of that story.

Qatar 2022 and human rights criticism. This is real and shouldn't be minimized: Infantino defended Qatar's hosting despite well-documented concerns about migrant worker treatment, and Norwegian federation president Lise Klaveness publicly declined to support his re-election over FIFA's handling of related human rights obligations. A fair defense doesn't pretend this criticism is illegitimate. It says: this is a genuine, separate axis of criticism from the "Infantino doesn't care about football's poorer nations" charge, and conflating the two — using frustration over Qatar to delegitimize his actual funding record — isn't intellectually honest either.

The 2026 European federation withdrawals. In the days after FFE collapsed, Finland, Wales, Serbia, Sweden, and Greece all withdrew their support for Infantino's re-election, citing governance and transparency concerns. This is real and recent, and worth sitting with rather than dismissing. But it's also worth noting precisely what it is: a wave of European federations reacting to a process failure, in the same weeks that CAF's executive committee unanimously reaffirmed its support, and that federation presidents from Egypt, Morocco, Niger, Mauritania, and Comoros publicly backed him. The confederation that has benefited most directly from his signature policy is the one that didn't walk away.


Why Africa's support isn't naivety, and shouldn't be treated as such

A recurring insinuation, including from some domestic critics, is that African federations back Infantino because FIFA money "buys loyalty" and insulates administrators from scrutiny over how they use it. This deserves to be taken seriously rather than dismissed — Article 3 of this series documents real, serious accountability failures in how some African federations have handled FIFA and CAF funds, from Nigeria's ongoing parliamentary probe to the life sentence handed down in the Republic of Congo.

But that's an argument for stronger auditing of federations, not evidence that Infantino's funding itself is a bribe. CAF President Patrice Motsepe didn't offer unconditional praise when his executive committee backed Infantino in August 2026 — he explicitly paired that support with a public call for FIFA to "review the processes" behind FFE and reaffirmed the importance of "transparency, due process and good governance." That's a confederation drawing a distinction critics of the "bought loyalty" theory rarely credit it with: support for the funding record, alongside pressure for better process, held at the same time, by the same people.


The honest complication, and where this leaves the case

None of this means Infantino is beyond fair criticism, and a real defense doesn't need to pretend otherwise. The FFE rollout was mishandled by his own team's admission. Qatar's hosting remains a legitimate site of criticism he has never fully answered. A cleared criminal investigation still cost three years of his presidency under a cloud, and reasonable people can debate whether meeting privately and repeatedly with the attorney general investigating your own organization was wise, even if it wasn't criminal.

What doesn't hold up is the specific charge this series has been examining: that Infantino is the obstacle to African football getting its fair share of the sport's money. On the actual funding record, he is the FIFA president under whom that share grew fastest, by a wide margin, and the confederation with the most at stake backed him precisely because it noticed. If there's a villain in the story of who's blocking African football's money, the evidence in this series points elsewhere — toward the confederations wealthy enough not to need the deal, who killed it on process grounds without offering a substitute for the federations that did.


Sources consulted: FIFA official statements (inside.fifa.com), BBC Sport, Reuters, ESPN, CNN, Al Jazeera, Inside World Football, Play the Game, the Ecofin Agency, The National, New Lines Magazine, allAfrica, and Innovation Village, current as of August 22, 2026.